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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Although peer review is still the prevalent way by which individual research quality is judged, and
most researchers prefer an explicit peer assessment of their work, those same researchers know how
time-consuming peer assessment can be. The most obvious alternative available to rank the quality
of scientists, and, by extension, of scientiﬁc units (interpreted here not only as individual authors,
but also as university departments, journals, countries or other geographical areas) is using their
citation record–that is, the number and impact of their publications. As a result, a good deal of
work is currently concerned with converting those citation records into diﬀerent (cardinal) measures
of quality. The key is focusing not on where unit publish but on how many times other scientists
cite their work, and translate this data into a scalar measure.
In this note I shall develop a model in which a decision maker, which I dub “evaluator” tackles
the problem of ranking a given set of research units. My treatment of this problem borrows
heavily from Camacho’s (1979a, 1979b, 1980, 1982) approach to cardinal utility in a social choice
context. The reader is referred to his works, and the follow up by Wakker (1986), for a detailed
description of this literature. For my purposes here, it is suﬃcient to know that the model provides
conditions under which preferences on a set X of alternatives extend to cardinal preferences on the
n-fold cartesian product of X for any natural n. My task here is translating this result into the
context of measuring scientiﬁc output. This can be easily accomplished by: (i) taking as the set
of alternatives the set N0 of possible citation scores for any publication,1 (ii) identifying the set of
all possible citation records for a unit as the n-fold cartesian product of N0, and (iii) extending the
natural order on N0 to a cardinal utility function on sequences of elements in this cartesian product
under some “plausible” conditions.
I shall proceed now to brieﬂy enumerate informally these assumptions:
1. The evaluator can consistently and completely order any given set of scientiﬁc units.
2. For any pair of units having published a single publication each, the evaluator prefers the
unit having received more citations.
3. For any unit, its ranking depends only on the citation scores entering the citation record to
be evaluated and not on the order in which scores are presented.
1 For ease of exposition, I assume throughout that the citation count of any given paper is a non-negative integer.
The representation results in this paper, however, hold for any set of possible citations which is countable. In
particular, one can choose this set to be Q+, allowing citations scores to be counted fractionally, for instance, in
multi-authored publications.
14. The evaluator’s preferences between two units is independent of publications having the same
citation score.
5. There is not a publication that is by itself necessary or suﬃc i e n tt om a k eau n i tp r e f e r r e d
over another. The ranking between any pair of units may be reversed by a suﬃcient number
of additional publications.
The main result is that these assumptions are suﬃcient for the construction of an additively
separable representation of the evaluator’s preferences. This representation allows for a cardinal
measure of inﬂuence that may overcome some of the criticisms commonly raised against single-
number criteria to evaluate scientiﬁc output, as the sensibility to a small number of “big hits”, or
the penalization of high productivity.
2 Set-up and examples
I am concerned with a (binary) relation % over ordered pairs in a nonempty set of scientiﬁc units
X represented as mappings from a set of articles to the set of possible citation scores. For each
unit x ∈ X, I denote by |x| the number of articles published by this unit over a given period T and
by xi the number of citations for each article,2 arranged in some pre-speciﬁed order. I focus on
t h ec a s ei nw h i c ht h es e to fp o s s i b l ec i t a t i o ns c o r e sxi is N0.( N om a j o rd i ﬃculties arise with the
extension to any countable spaces). For mathematical convenience, I work with inﬁnite sequences
{xi}i∈N with “tail” −1. Slightly abusing notation, then, I shall thereafter identify X with the set
of all sequences {xi}i∈N for which xi ∈ N0 ∪ {−1} for all i,a n d|{i | xi 6= −1}| = |x| < +∞.
Given x ∈ X, a performance index as deﬁned in the literature of citation analysis is a mapping
from X into R which quantiﬁes the impact of every possible output in X. What is sought are
measures leading to rankings that hopefully would make sense to authors, editors, publishers, etc.
having potentially diﬀerent preferences. The following are some examples of rankings induced by
performance indices taken from this literature:
• Total number of papers: np,tot(x)=|x|.
The ranking based on the np,tot score focuses on total production and completely disregards
the information about impact or visibility of each article.




The ranking induced by the nc,tot score measures is based on the total impact of a unit’s
research, and is independent of the volume of production needed to obtain a given score.
2 In particular, this reduced form of the citation network implies that all citations are independent of the citing
paper. This way of modelling is, however, “plug compatible” with an analysis in which citations are weighted
depending on the journal on which the citing paper is published, as in Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2004) or Slutzki
and Volij (2006).
2• Mean citation rate (Impact factor): MCR(x)=nc,tot (x)/np,tot (x). [Garﬁeld (1972)]
Ranking units according to the MCR rewards units publishing widely cited papers and pe-
nalizes those showing more diversity and sustainability in research. Initially developed for
journals, nowadays it is also used as a proxy for rating individual scientists.
• Number of highly cited publications: HCPα(x)=|{i | xi ≥ α}|.
The number HCPα gives an idea of broad and sustained impact. However, it is often criticized
by arbitrariness in the choice of the threshold α.
• Hirsch index: h(x)=|{i | xi ≥ i}|. [Hirsch (2005)]
The h-index induces a ranking that attempts to evaluate both the scientiﬁc productivity
and the apparent scientiﬁci m p a c to fau n i t .I ni t sﬁve years of life, the h-index has been the
biggest splash in a ﬂood of rating measures for individuals.3 The main reason for its popularity
seems to be: (i) it is relatively insensitive to large numbers of lowly cited publications, (ii)
it is also relatively insensitive to a few very highly cited publications, (iii) the calculation
is easy to understand, and (iv) recently, some authors (Woeginger (2008a,2008b), Quesada
(2009a, 2009b) or Marchant (2009)) provide lists that completely characterize it, thus greatly
facilitating its applicability in a given context.
In the remaining of the paper, rather than delve immediately into particular methods because
they look reasonable or yield intuitive results, I start from the scratch and focus on the type of
structure that one might impose on preferences guaranteeing an additive utility representation but
avoiding the straitjacket of a particular functional.
3A x i o m s
I am interested in ﬁnding conditions that lead to a simple representation of the evaluator’s prefer-
ences. I next introduce some basic properties that % may satisfy. As usual, the symbols Â and ∼
correspond to strict preference and indiﬀerence.
Throughout the paper I will assume:
A1 (Weak order) % is complete and transitive.
3 Panaretos and Malesios (2009) or Alonso et al. (2009) oﬀer comprehensive reviews of the bibliometrics literature
on the topic. Even more recent works are Quesada (2009a, 2009b) and Marchant (2009, 2010). Among economists,
Ruan and Toll (2008) apply the h-index metric to rank economics departments in the Republic of Ireland, and Harzing
and van der Wal (2008) use it as an alternative metric to the ISI Impact Factor. Harzing (2009) oﬀers a software
program, Publish or Perish, which uses Google Scholar database to obtain several indexes of quality, among them
the h-index and the closely related g-index (Egghe (2006a, 2006b)).
3Although A1 is fairly standard in decision theory, in this context it is a strong axiom, and
precludes situations in which the evaluator uses the intersection of several indices to rank units
(which leads to an incomplete relation %) or neglects small diﬀerences in citation records (which
implies an intransitive ∼).
A2 (Monotonicity) For all x,y ∈ X,i f|x| = |y| =1 ,then x Â y if and only if x1 >y 1.
A2 states that from the point of view of the evaluator, impact is desirable, therefore when com-
paring units containing a single publication each, the unit with more citations should be preferred.
This axiom is rather weak, and it is satisﬁed by all the examples showed in the previous section.
In order to motivate my third axiom, notice that, without further conditions, the order in which
p a p e r sa r eo r d e r e dm i g h tb ea ni s s u ef o rt h ee v a l u a t or. In this way, I shall require that a reordering
of the publications of a unit does not change its ranking. Thus, the varying orders in which at least
some articles can be counted (e.g. chronologically, from high to low impact, or any other variant)
should not matter. Namely,
A3 (Permutability) For all x,y ∈ X and n ∈ N, if σ is a permutation on {1,...,n} such
that yi = xσ(i) for all i ∈ {1,...,n} and yi = xi for all i/ ∈ {1,...,n}, then x ∼ y.
Axiom A3 precludes “reputation eﬀects”, which would make the evaluation of an article depen-
dent on the impact of preceding publications.
The following axiom explores further the separability of preferences across publications by
requiring that the preference between units x and y should be independent of publications have
identical impact:










j = yj ∀j 6= i,
then x < y if and only if x∗ < y∗.
A4 is undoubtedly a strong assumption. In particular, if units x and y share some publication i,
(i.e. xi = yi), and x Â y, then this relative position is unaﬀected by the impact of this publication.
Interestingly, the well known h-index and its variants, as the g-index (Egghe (2006a, 2006b)) violate
independence. However, life without independence can lead to somewhat paradoxical results: It
may be the case that x Â y when units x and y are research groups but using the same utility
preference relation at the individual level each researcher in x outperforms each researcher in y.I n
the light of this shortcoming, I regard independence as a desirable property.
Finally, I shall assume:
4A5 (Archimedean) For all x, y, x∗,a n dy∗ ∈ X with x Â y and x∗ Â y∗ there exists m ∈ N




i|x|+j = xj ∀ 0 ≤ i<mand 1 ≤ j ≤ |x|
x0
m|x|+j = y∗
j ∀ 1 ≤ j ≤ |x∗|
x0





i|x|+j = yj ∀ 0 ≤ i<mand 1 ≤ j ≤ |y|
y0
m|y|+j = x∗
j ∀ 1 ≤ j ≤ |x∗|
y0
j = −1 if j>m|y| + |x∗|
then x0 < y0.
Notice that the “untailed” part of x0 is constructed using m replicas of the “untailed” part of
x, followed by one replica of the “untailed” part of y∗.U n i t y0 is built in the same way using
instead m replicas of the “untailed” part of y and one of the “untailed” part of x∗. A5 implies that
the diﬀerence between any pair of units x∗ and y∗ can be compensated by by a suﬃciently large
number of diﬀerences between x and y.
Archimedean-like axioms are necessary whenever one wishes to obtain a numerical representa-
tion of a weak order. In particular, A5 would fail if preferences are “lexicographic” in the sense
that some publications combined with other ones in whatever manner would always lead to a strict
preference.
4 A (cardinal) representation of the evaluator’s preferences
The ﬁve axioms introduced in the preceding section lead to the following representation result:
Theorem 4.1 Preferences < over scientiﬁc units satisfy A1-A5 if and only if there is increasing
real-valued mapping u from N0 such that, for all x and y ∈ X,
x < y ⇐⇒
X
i∈N
[u(xi) − u(yi)] ≥ 0. (1)
The function u is unique up to scale and location, i.e. if (1) holds, u can be replaced by v if and
only if v = βu+ τ for some β, τ ∈ R with β>0.
Proof. Necessity is easily established. Suﬃciency follows from Theorem 1.1 in Wakker (1986),
which guarantees that A1, A3, A4, and A5 imply the existence and the uniqueness of u up to a
linear transformation such that representation (1) holds. A2 guarantees that such a u must be
increasing.
C o n d i t i o n sA 1 - A 5l e a dt oar e p r e s e n t a t i o nf o r< which separate the eﬀect of the size and the
distribution of impact. I shall introduce here some additional notation to formalize this. For a
given x ∈ X,l e tfx = {fx (i)}
i∈N0 be its relative distribution of papers according to impact, i.e., for
5all i ∈ N0, fx (i) ∈ Q+ is the proportion of papers published by unit x having received exactly i
citations. By setting u(−1) = 0, representation (1) can be written as
x < y ⇐⇒ |x|
X
i∈N0




where u is now unique up to scale.
4.1 Remarks on the shape of u
Some popular citation measures may be derived from representations (1) or (2) by imposing addi-
tional conditions which constraint the shape of the function u, which I dub the impact function.
By imposing this impact function equal to a positive constant, the representation (1) implies that
the evaluator ranks units in accordance with the total number of publications np,tot. If the impact
function is linear, one obtains the ranking based on the total number of citations (nc,tot), i.e. the
utility of any unit x ∈ X is given by the total impact of its research, and is independent of the
volume of production needed to obtain a given score. Clearly, for the impact function to be linear, it
is necessary that if a unit gets an additional citation, it should not matter which of its publications
receives this citation. Namely,
A6 (Transferability) For all x ∈ X and for all i, j ∈ N, if
½
x∗
i = xi +1
x∗




j = xj +1
x0
k = xk ∀k 6= j,
then x∗ ∼ x0.
Under A6, additional citations are perfect substitutes across diﬀerent publications of the same
unit. When added to the conditions used in Theorem 1, it is suﬃcient to obtain a ranking based
in the total number of citations:
Corollary 4.2 Preferences < over scientiﬁc units satisfy A1-A6 if and only if for all x and y ∈ X,
x < y ⇐⇒
X
i∈N
[xi − yi] ≥ 0. (3)
Proof. Necessity is straightforward. I show suﬃciency. By Theorem 1, A1-A5 imply that here is
an increasing u such that u(−1) = 0 and U(x)=
X
i∈N u(xi). For any pair i, j ∈ N, (j>i )s e tx
be such that ⎧
⎨
⎩
xk = z +1 i fk = i
yk = z if k = j
yk = −1 ∀ k 6= i, j




yk = z +1 i fk = i
yk = z +1 i fk = j





zk = z +2 i fk = i
zk = z if k = j
zk = −1 ∀ k 6= i, j
respectively. By A6, x ∼ y ∼ z,t h e nu(z +2 )−u(z +1 )=u(z +1 )− u(z)h o l d sf o ra n yg i v e nz
hence u must be linear.
A6 implies constant marginal utility of the impact of citations. Of course, the axiom can be
easily modiﬁed so that the marginal utility of citations below a certain threshold α is zero. This
yields the ranking based on the number of highly cited publications (HCPα).
The case in which this marginal utility is decreasing deserves further analysis. Although there
is a sense of arbitrariness in asking about the possibility of having {u(xi)}
|x|
i=1 concave,4 and there
seems to be no simple defense of global concavity (or global convexity for that matter) in this
context, the next section oﬀers some justiﬁcation for its use: I shall come to that soon. Meanwhile,
I remark that the concavity of the impact function attenuates the inﬂuence of one highly cited
article which may not be representative of the broad impact of the unit, hence capturing one of the
most appealing features of the h-index but still retaining the property of independence.
A7 (Concavity) For all x ∈ X and for all i, j ∈ N with xi >x j, if
½
x∗
i = xi +1
x∗




j = xj +1
x0
k = xk ∀k 6= j,
then x∗ ≺ x0.
If we add A7 to axioms A1-A5, we get
Corollary 4.3 Preferences < over scientiﬁc units satisfy A1-A5 and A7 if and only if there is
increasing and concave real-valued mapping u from N0 such that, for all x and y ∈ X,
x < y ⇐⇒
X
i∈N
[u(xi) − u(yi)] ≥ 0. (4)
If (2) holds, u can be replaced by a mapping v if and only if v = βu+ τ for some β, τ ∈ R with
β>0.
Proof. Essentially the same as the proof of Corollary 4.2
4 A ﬁnite sequence S = {z1,z 2,...,z m} in R is concave iﬀ it is strictly increasing and z1 − z2 ≥ z2 − z3 ≥ ···≥
zm − zm+1.
74.2 Remarks on size
It is clear that under A1-A5, the evaluator’s preferences are not size-invariant, in the sense that
two diﬀerent units having the same relative distribution of citations are never indiﬀerent. In fact,
A1-A5 imply a multiplicative scaling behavior. To see this, deﬁne, for all x ∈ X,a n dt ∈ N,t h e
unit tx in X constructed by repeating t times the sequence of papers in x, so that the untailed
part of tx consists of t replicas of the untailed part of x.S i n c e tx and x have the same relative




fx (i)u(i)=tU(x), i.e. U is homogeneous of degree 1 in t. This property
raises questions about the nature of the scientiﬁc units under evaluation:
On the one hand, a unit that publishes a larger number of papers has a higher likelihood of
generating higher utility, since every article presents another chance for citations. Nothing wrong
with that if think that a unit that publishes a larger number of high impact papers has indeed a
bigger inﬂuence on the ﬁeld. If this inﬂuence is what the evaluator is attempting to measure, one
can argue that the scaling feature implied by A1-A5 is an appealing property.
On the other hand, the presence of scaling-eﬀects would be a disadvantage when evaluating, for
instance, the standing of individual articles in a journal (as this measure should not be dependent on
the number of articles published in that journal). Moreover, when preferences are size-dependent,
a unit might try to manipulate its ranking by splitting all their papers into smaller pieces. It was
this kind of perverse eﬀects that were in the mind of Eugene Garﬁeld more than 50 years ago when
developing the Impact factor (IF) as a size-independent index (for a throughout discussion on this
topic see Garﬁeld (2006) and the references therein).
Clearly, if the evaluator wishes to capture the spirit of the IF, it must be through the nor-
malization of the number of citations received by the size of the sequence of publications, so that
the utility of a unit becomes homogeneous of degree 0 in the number of replicas t of any given
distribution. That is,
A8 (Size Invariance) For all x ∈ X and for all t ∈ N, tx ∼ x.
A8 is incompatible with A1-A5. Thus, if one accepts A8 as a desirable property we know that
at least one of the ﬁve axioms in Theorem 4.1 will be violated. It is straightforward to check that
the IF and similar average indices satisfy A1-A4 and A8, but violate the Archimedean axiom A5.
They are compatible, however, with the following variant of the archimedean axiom, ﬁrst proposed
in Bouyssou and Marchant (2010):
A5∗ (Archimedean∗) For all x, y,a n dz ∈ X with |x| = |y| = |z| there exist n, m, n∗,a n d





i|x|+j = xj ∀ 0 ≤ i<nand 1 ≤ j ≤ |x|
x∗
n|x|+j = zj ∀ 0 ≤ i<mand 1 ≤ j ≤ |z|
x∗





i|x|+j = xj ∀ 0 ≤ i<n ∗ and 1 ≤ j ≤ |x|
z∗
n∗|x|+j = zj ∀ 0 ≤ i<m ∗ and 1 ≤ j ≤ |z|
z∗
j =0 ∀ j>n ∗ |x| + m∗ |z|.
then
x Â y Â z =⇒ x∗ Â (n + m)y and (n∗ + m∗)y Â z∗.
A5∗ implies that for any three units of the same size, by merging a suﬃciently large number (n)
of replicas of the highest ranked unit with a suﬃciently small number of replicas (m)o ft h el o w e s t
ranked unit we obtain a new composed unit which has a higher ranking than n+m replicas of the
intermediate unit. However, we can reverse this preference by selecting other naturals n∗ and m∗
where n∗ is small compared to m∗.
R e p l a c i n gA 5b yA 5 ∗ yields the following result:
Theorem 4.4 Preferences < over scientiﬁc units satisfy A1-A4, A5∗, and A8 if and only if there
is an increasing real-valued mapping u from N0 such that, for all x and y ∈ X,











The function u is unique up to scale and location, i.e. if (1) holds, u can be replaced by v if and
only if v = βu+ τ for some β, τ ∈ R with β>0.
Proof. Necessity is trivial. I show suﬃciency. This result is essentially Bouyssou and Marchant
(2010, Thm. 1), and uses the representation result in Shepherdson (1980, Thm. 5.2) for the set ∆
of probability distributions with rational support. From preferences <, I induce a binary relation
<∗ on ∆ as follows: For any pair π, μ ∈ ∆, π <∗ μ ⇐⇒ x < y where fx = π and fy = μ.
I claim that this relation is well deﬁned. To prove this, notice ﬁrst that fx ∼ fy implies x ∼ y
(from A3, |x|x ∼ |y|y,a n df r o mA 8x ∼ |x|x and y ∼ |y|y,h e n c ex ∼ y by transitivity).
To prove the converse, suppose x < y and fx ≺∗ fy.T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t fx = fx0, fy = fy0 and
x0 ≺ y0 for some x0,y0 ∈ X.T h u s ,x ∼ x0 and y ∼ y0. Since by hypothesis x < y and x0 ≺ y0,
transitivity of < leads to x0 < y0and x0 ≺ y0, which proves the claim by contradiction. It follows
from Bouyssou and Marchant (2010, Thm. 1) that A1, A3, A4 and A5∗ together imply an expected






fx (i)u(i)w h e r e
u i su n i q u eu pt oa na ﬃne transformation. The fact that A2 implies u increasing completes the
proof.
Applying additional restrictions on the shape of u, the following corollaries are now available:
9Corollary 4.5 Preferences < over scientiﬁc units satisfy A1-A4, A5∗,A 6a n dA 8i fa n do n l yi f
units are ranked according to their IF, i.e. for all x and y ∈ X,











Proof. Apply the result from Corollary 4.5.
Corollary 4.6 Preferences < over scientiﬁc units satisfy A1-A4, A5∗,A 7a n dA 8i fa n do n l yi f
there is increasing and concave real-valued mapping u from N0 such that, for all x and y ∈ X,











If (6) holds, u can be replaced by a mapping v if and only if v = βu+ τ for some β, τ ∈ R with
β>0.
Proof. Apply the result from Corollary 4.6.
5 Relation between stochastic dominance and rankings
By identifying a citation distribution with a probability distribution,5 readers familiar with the
theory of choice under risk will readily recognize the clear analogy between the impact function u
and the Bernoulli function in expected utility theory.6 I will make use of this formal resemblance
to borrow results on stochastic dominance from the economic literature on ﬁnance and poverty
analysis. This transposition will allow for unit comparisons without actually selecting a speciﬁc
impact function.
Formally, for any unit x ∈ X with relative distribution of citations fx,l e tFx (i)=
Pi
j=1 fx (j)
be its cumulative distribution function. I say that x ﬁrst order stochastically dominates y (and I
write x <FSD y) if and only if D1 (i)=Fx (i) − Fy (i) ≤ 0 for all i ∈ N0.I tt h e nf o l l o w s :
Proposition 5.1 x <FSD y if and only if x < y for all rankings satisfying A1-A4, A5∗,a n dA 8 .
Proof. Let x and y ∈ X with x 6= y. Suppose that x <FSD y. Theorem 4.4 guarantees that
for any given ranking satisfying A1-A4, A5∗,a n dA 8 ,x < y if and only if
P
i∈N0 fx (i)u(i) ≥
P
i∈N0 fy (i)u(i)f o rs o m eu increasing. Now Abel’s lemma7 yields, for N∗ =m a x ( |x|,|y|),
5 It is also possible to identify a citation distribution with an income distribution. This is the approach in Albarr´ an
et al. (2009), which introduce into citation analysis a methodology borrowed from measurements of economic poverty.
6 Boyssou and Marchant (2010) exploit this similarity to analyze and oﬀer an extension of the IF factor for
journals.
7 Abel’s lemma can be viewed as a discrete version of the formula of integration by parts. It states that given










j=1 xj. (For an inductive






i=1 [fx (i) − fy (i)]u(i)=
PN∗−1
i=1 D1 (i)[u(i) − u(i +1 ) ] +
D(N∗)u(N∗)=
PN∗−1
i=1 D1 (i)[u(i) − u(i +1 ) ]≥ 0.
To prove the “only if” part reasoning by contradiction, suppose x <FSD y does not hold. Then,
there exists j such that D1 (j) > 0. Let us consider u : N0 → R where u(i)=u(i +1 )∀i 6= j,a n d
u(j +1 )>u(j). Since u is increasing, by Theorem 6.1 it induces a ranking < which satisﬁes A1-
A4, A5∗,a n dA 7 ,t h u sb yh y p o t h e s i sx < y and therefore,
P
i∈N0 fx (i)u(i) −
P
i∈N0 fy (i)u(i)=
D1 (j)[u(j) − u(j +1 ) ]> 0 a contradiction.
A more restricted class of rankings is given when in addition to A1-A4, A5∗ and A8, we impose
A7. It turns out that all rankings of this more restricted class give an unanimous order between




j=1 [Fx (j) − Fy (j)]. By deﬁnition, x stochastically dominates y at second order
(written x <SSD y)i fD2 (i) ≤ 0 for all arguments i ∈ N0. Then,
Proposition 5.2 x <SSD y if and only if x < y for all rankings satisfying A1-A4, A5∗,A 7a n d
A8.






i=1 D1 (i)[u(i) − u(i +1 ) ] .
I shall use again Abel’s lemma to get
PN∗−1





















D2 (i)[u(i +1 )− u(i) − u(i +2 )+u(i +1 ) ]+D2 (N∗ − 1)[u(N∗) − u(N∗ − 1)].
It is clear that if x <SSD y then the expression above is positive for any u increasing and concave,
and therefore by Theorem 4.4 x < y for all rankings satisfying A1-A4, A5∗,A 7a n dA 8 .
To see the converse, suppose
P
i∈N0 fx (i)u(i) −
P
i∈N0 fy (i)u(i) ≥ 0 for any u increasing and
concave. If there exists j such that D2 (j) > 0, then consider u : N0 → R where u(i)=u(i +1 ) ,
∀i>j+1 ,u(j +1 ) >u (j)a n du(i +2 )− u(i +1 )=u(i +1 )− u(i), ∀i ≤ j − 1. We have
u increasing and concave and
P
i∈N0 fx (i)u(i) −
P
i∈N0 fy (i)u(i)=D2 (j)[u(j) − u(j +1 ) ]< 0
which contradicts the hypothesis.
6 The connection between rankings and prospects
In the previous sections, uncertainty is not present. Therefore, the evaluator is assumed to know
with certainty the impact of each of the publications of any given unit. However, as the propositions
5.1 and 5.2 show, there is a formal analogy between concepts expressed in terms of citation records
and uncertainty counterparts. Indeed, it is possible to go beyond this formal resemblance and link
both models as follows:
11(i) Let π =( π1,...,π i,...)a n dπ∗ =( π∗
1,...,π∗







i =1 ) ,a n dl e tx1,...,x i,... and x∗
1,...,x ∗
i,...
be sequences of outcomes in N0 generated, respectively, by π and π∗.
(ii) From the binary relation % over X, we can obtain utility indices ui = u(xi), which are
constant up to positive scale transformations, and such that for any given k ∈ N the sequence
xk =( x1,...,x k,−1,...) is at least as good as the sequence x∗
k =( x∗
1,...,x ∗
k,−1...)i fa n d
only if
Pk




(iii) By the weak law of large numbers, random variables Zk = 1
k
Pk






converge in probability respectively to
P




i)a sk → +∞.
(iv) Given two prospects P and P∗ giving prizes ui (xi)a n dui (x∗
i) with probabilities πi and
π∗
i respectively, the rule of maximizing the expected value prescribes choosing P over P∗
whenever
P





Therefore, we can conclude limk→+∞ Pr[Zk >Z ∗
k]=1 . But Pr[Zk >Z ∗









=P r [ xk Â x∗
k]. Thus,
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How can we interpret these results? The rationale underlying all citation analysis is that
citation data should be strongly correlated such that a “good” unit has a far higher probability
of publishing a highly cited paper than a “bad” unit. This hypothesis appears to be fulﬁlled in
practice when units are authors,8 and seems also plausible in the case in which units are journals.
I think likely that authors may consider that the past distribution of citations of papers published
in a journal gives some information on the future selection process in this journal and its visibility
in the scientiﬁc community. In such a case, the author’s risk attitudes may play a role in the choice
of a journal to which submit a paper. Provided that the impact function u can be interpreted as a
Bernoulli function9 and that the relative distribution of citations remains the same along the time,
I show that both approaches are consistent: Namely, as the sample of papers increases, preferences
satisfying A1-A4, A5∗, and A8 approach the ranking obtained by applying the expected utility
rule.
7 Wrapping up and suggestions for further research
At the end of the day, all measurements of research quality are hard to shallow; citation analysis,
no matter how sophisticated it may be, cannot possibly be a perfect substitute for critical reading
8 Lehmann et al. (2003) oﬀer signiﬁcant correlations from data in high energy physics.
9 A word of caution: This is a rather strong assumption. In this paper, the utility function u is derived in a
riskless framework. In expected utility theory, however, the Bernoulli function is derived from axioms regardering
the ordering of probability distributions or uncertain prospects.
12and expert judgement. However, the bottom line is that quality measures are here to stay, and
will remain a hot topic in science during the coming years. Probably, not because of any truth
waiting to be discovered. Rather, because sciences (and this includes economics) are subject to
market forces and the internet has enabled a plethora of low-cost measures to rank research output.
Schools and labs are using such rankings as a shorthand assessment of quality to help them make
grants, bestow tenure, award bonuses or hire postdocs. An analogy which I have in mind when
thinking about these measures is that they do for scientists what U.S. News & World Report does
for Colleges and the QB rating does for american football.
So far, the merits of most measures rely largely on intuitive arguments and value judgements.
In fact, several are often only vaguely related to the intuitive ideas they purport to index, and many
are so complex that is diﬃcult to discover what, if anything, they are measuring. Admittedly, I
have written this paper as a reaction to this ﬂow of work. This work is unlikely to change the mind
of those scientists whose disbelief in the beneﬁts of inﬂuence measures is unshakable, but it may
help those who are still undecided about these beneﬁts by bringing economic methodology to bear
on the ranking problem. Rather than identify a weakness on some existing ranking and proposing
a new method which avoids the same weakness, I present a utility theory for citations records that
allows to discuss rankings in terms of a set of preference constraints that entirely characterize a
family of rankings. Whether or not this utility theory is better or worse than others remains to be
seen. I am aware of the limitations of its applicability and I indicated this fact in Section 3 when
I discussed the axioms. It is not my purpose is to claim that a given method based on citation
records is the correct way of measuring quality.10 However, without investigating characterizing
properties, we will not have a complete picture of the situation.
The analysis of the discussed model may be extended and modiﬁed in numerous ways. Since
Theorems 4.1 and 4.4 single out a cardinal utility function u for the number of citations which does
not involve the ordering of uncertain prospects, the problem of the interpretation of such function
as a Bernoulli function raises subtle questions. More concretely, if we suppose that the evaluator
satisﬁes the axioms in Theorem 4.4 and the axioms necessary for an expected utility representation
with Bernoulli function u∗, what is the relationship between u and u∗? Since no uncertainty is
involved in obtaining u, and, on the other hand, u∗ is derived from the ordering of probability
distributions, this relationship seems to capture the risk attitude of the evaluator with respect to
citation records. On a tentative basis, if u∗ = φ(u), it makes sense to say that the evaluator is risk
neutral (respectively risk averse, risk loving) if φ is linear (respectively strictly concave, strictly
convex). In such a case, only risk neutral behavior satisfy the convergence result in Section 6.
The connection between the problem of comparing distributions of citations and the problem of
comparing probability distributions may give rise to new concepts and models in both ﬁelds. For
10 This objective is appearing more and more like an unattainable “holy grail” for the bibliometric literature. See
for instance Adler et al. (2009).
13instance, models that separate tastes from beliefs in decision under uncertainty may oﬀer interesting
approaches to cope with distributions of citations. I think this question deserves more analysis,
and I hope to deal with it in another paper.
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